Tackling diversity inside WTO : the GATT moral clause after Colombia – Textiles by NUZZO, Silvia
  
TACKLING DIVERSITY INSIDE WTO:  
GATT MORAL CLAUSE AFTER COLOMBIA – TEXTILES 
Silvia Nuzzo*
After lying dormant for more than five decades, WTO 'public morals' exceptions have 
been more frequently invoked in recent times. During the last fifteen years, the number 
of disputes settled through the application of GATT 1994 Art. XX(a) and the 
homologue GATS Art. XIV has gone from zero to four – and it is likely to keep 
growing. This could be partially due to WTO expanding membership which facilitates 
trade connections between countries with different, sometimes opposite cultural and 
social backgrounds. The interpretation and application of the moral clause entail 
difficult challenges for WTO Panels and for the Appellate Body (AB). They are called 
to find a balance not only between trade and non-trade values, but also and most of all 
between WTO Members' regulatory autonomy and their standard of review. 
However, WTO case law shows an ongoing struggle to find the best way to accomplish 
this task. Moving on from the analysis of the Colombia – Textiles dispute, this 
article will discuss the judicial application of the 'moral clause'. It will compare 
Colombia – Textiles with the former case law, paying particular attention to some 
crucial aspects of the AB's legal reasoning in Colombia – Textiles and their potential 
implications for future case law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After both Liberia and Afghanistan successfully negotiated their accession 
terms in July 2016,1 the World Trade Organization (WTO) now numbers a 
total of 164 Members, while several other countries are expected to join in 
forthcoming years.2 During the last few decades, the WTO has thus 
developed into a complex mosaic of heterogeneous countries, which include 
a variety of cultures, religions, and customs.  
The growing diversity inside the WTO gives rise to a challenge of the highest 
significance: given that a State may restrict trade in order to protect social, 
cultural or religious preferences, how should regulatory autonomy be 
balanced with core WTO substantive obligations, such as the Most-
Favoured-Nation clause and the National-Treatment clause? To put it in 
other terms, where should the line be drawn between policy choices by 
Member States and the mere violation of trade liberalization commitments 
vis-à-vis the other Members? 
WTO Members and adjudicating bodies have at their disposal the general 
exceptions enshrined in Article XX GATT to draw such a line. This 
provision allows WTO Members to pursue national policy objectives 
through trade restrictive measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with 
GATT, provided that the measures at stake comply with the requirements 
laid down by the Article.3 The provision sets out an exhaustive list of 
                                                 
1 See respectively, <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_lbr_14jul 
16_e.htm> and <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_afg_29jul16_ 
e.htm> accessed 1 October 2016. 
2 For a glance of the countries currently negotiating their accession, see <https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm> accessed 1 
October 2016.  
3 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 
I.L.M. 1153 (1994). Also GATS provides for the same exceptions in Art. XIV: see 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
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objectives from (a) to (j) that may justify the enforcement of a policy deviating 
from a Member's obligations. In particular, for the purpose of this Article, 
paragraph (a) states that a prima facie protectionist measure may be justified 
if 'necessary to protect public morals'. Referred to as the 'moral clause', this 
provision allows cultural, religious and social considerations of a 
geographically-localized nature to be balanced against the commitments of 
free trade.4  
The last of the four disputes settled applying the moral clause is Colombia – 
Textiles.5 It should be noted that these four episodes only occurred during the 
last fifteen years, whereas WTO Members have been familiar with some of 
the other exceptions since the GATT era. For instance, they have frequently 
invoked paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) in disputes concerning environmental 
protection.6 The first paragraph justifies trade-restrictive measures necessary 
                                                 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 284 (1999), Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994). 
4 See ex multis, Jeremy C Marwell, 'Trade and Morality: the WTO Public Morals 
Exception after Gambling' (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 816. 
5 See US – Gambling (2003); China – Audiovisual Products (2007); EC – Seal Products 
(2009). 
6 See eg Canada – Herring and Salmon (1986); Thailand – Cigarettes (1989); Tuna – 
Dolphin I and II (1991 and 1992); US – Car Taxes (1994); US – Gasoline (1995); US – 
Shrimps (1997); EC – Asbestos (1998); Brazil – Retreated Tyres (2005); China – Raw 
Materials (2009); China – Rare Earths (2012). As above, the dates refer to the year in 
which consultations were requested. Since this body of decisions is now well 
established, the relevant literature on the issue is now vast: see eg Manjiao Chi, 
''Exhaustible Natural Resource' in WTO Law: Article XX (g) GATT Disputes and 
Their Implications' (2014) Journal of World Trade 939; Arwel Davies, 
'Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the New Approach in 
Brazil – Tyres' (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 507; Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, 
'The World Trade Organisation and the Protection of the Natural Environment: 
Recent Trends in the Interpretation of GATT Article XX(b) and (g) GATT' 
(2000) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 272; Ilaria Espa, 'The 
Appellate Body Approach to the Applicability of Article XX GATT In the Light 
of China - Raw Materials: A Missed Opportunity?' (2012) Journal of World Trade 
1399; Robert Howse, 'The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A 
New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate' (2002) Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 491. 
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to protect 'human, animal, or plant life or health'; the second addresses 
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the GATT; finally, the third refers to measures related to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.7 The widening WTO 
membership could have played a role in the growing of trade-morality 
conflicts among WTO Members, bringing together States with opposite 
socioeconomic compositions and cultural views.8  
The traditional interpretation of Art. XX consists of a two-tier test: the 
measure must first be justified under one of the Art. XX exceptions, before 
being tested against the chapeau of Art. XX so as to verify that the measure is 
not applied in a manner which would constitute 'a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination'.9 This judicial test was developed and applied 
for the first time by the AB in the case US – Gasoline and it has never been 
altered by the subsequent decisions.10 Subsequent case law even bolstered 
this interpretation. In particular, the AB in US – Shrimps claimed that 'the 
sequence of steps indicated above in the analysis of a claim of justification 
under Art. XX GATT reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but 
rather the fundamental structure and logic of Art. XX GATT'.11  
                                                 
7 For an overview of Art. XX exceptions and the relative case law, see Petros C 
Mavroidis, George A Bermann and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) – Documents, Cases & Analysis (WEST: American Casebook 
Series 2010) 692-709. 
8 See Marwell (n 4) at 816; Mark Wu, 'Free Trade and the Protection of Public 
Morals: An Analysis of the Newly Emerging Public Moral Clause Doctrine' (2008) 
33 The Yale Journal of International Law 215. 
9 As Art. XX chapeau is common to all the subparagraphs, it has been frequently 
applied and its interpretation is already consolidated. Among the most relevant 
doctrine concerning Art. XX chapeau, see Lorand Bartels, 'Current Developments: 
The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS 
Agreement: A Reconstruction' (2015) (109)(1) The American Journal of 
International Law 95; Arwel (n 6) 518-521; Petros C Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: Second 
Edition (Oxford University Press 2012), 359ff; Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 7) 
685-692, 709-718. 
10 US – Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, at 22. 
11 See US – Shrimp, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12/10/ 1998, para 
119 (emphasis added). The Panel in China – Raw Materials supported this approach, 
maintaining that the legal consequence of the two-tier test is that, unless 
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Moreover, when this test is applied to the moral clause, the first tier of the 
test is divided into two additional steps. First, one needs to assess whether 
the measure is 'designed to protect public morals'; secondly, whether the 
measure is 'necessary to protect public morals', i.e. not disproportionately 
trade restrictive.12 In addition, both the 'design' and the 'necessity' steps are 
themselves divided into two tiers. With regard to the design of the measure, 
WTO judicial bodies need to verify whether the policy objective concerns 
the protection of public morals as defined and applied by a regulating 
Member 'in its territory, according to its own system and scale of values'.13 
Then, they need to assess whether its design and structure allow the measure 
to effectively protect public morals, i.e. whether there is a causal relationship 
between the objective and the measure.14 When assessing its necessity, in the 
first place a Panel needs to go through a 'process of weighing and balancing a 
series of factors', where the importance of the value at stake is balanced 
against the measure's trade-restrictiveness.15 In the second place, it needs to 
ascertain whether a less trade-restrictive measure could achieve the same 
level of protection pursued by the responding State, without entailing 
unreasonably higher enforcement costs.16 
                                                 
compliance with a subparagraph has been demonstrated, the test for the 
consistency of the measure with the chapeau is even superfluous: see China – Raw 
Materials, Report of the Panel, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, 5/07/ 
2011, para 7.469.  
12 EC – Seal Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS400/AB/R, 
WT/DS401/AB/R, 22/05/2014, para 5.169; Colombia – Textiles, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS461/AB/R, 07/06/2016, para 5.67. 
13 EC – Seal Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, 25/11/2013, 
paras 7.380-7.831. 
14 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel, WT/DS461/R, 27/11/2015  paras 7.295, 
7.297, 7.340 ff. See the cited Report for further references to previous case law. 
Among scholars, see eg Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, 'Proportionality and 
Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective' (2007) 20 Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs 71, 74ff. 
15 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
11/12/2000, para 164. 
16 This part of the test was developed by the Panel in US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
1930: see US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act 1930, Report of the Panel, L/6439 - 36S/345, 
7/11/1989, para 5.26. It was later improved by the Panel in US – Gasoline: see US – 
Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, 29/01/1996, paras 6.20ff. 
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Colombia – Textiles represents the ultimate application of the judicial test. 
After a brief case summary, Part I of this article will try to define the notion 
of 'public morals' and explain how its burden of proof may be satisfied. Part 
II will then focus on the 'design and structure' of the measure and the 
'necessity' test of Art. XX(a), putting the spotlight on the AB's legal 
reasoning in Colombia – Textiles. The latter will be also compared to the 
former case law, in order to highlight the points of convergence and 
divergence. In particular, when applying the traditional judicial test, the AB 
tried to clarify some of its crucial aspects. However, the AB's approach opens 
the door to more questions than it answers. In particular, the AB's 
interpretation of the necessity test seems affected by considerable flaws in 
logic. This article will thus try to shed light on the potential implications of 
the AB's conclusions, and also to propose some interpretative adjustments to 
the traditional paradigm.  
II. COLOMBIA – TEXTILES: CASE SUMMARY 
After consultations with Colombia ended unsuccessfully, on 19 August 2013 
Panama requested the Dispute Settlement Body to establish a Panel with 
respect to the imposition by Colombia of a compound tariff affecting the 
importation of textiles, apparel and footwear.17 According to Panama's 
allegations, due to the tariff's composition and the values applied, the 
measure exceeded the levels bound in Colombia's Schedule of Concessions 
with respect to the relevant products. Consequently, Panama complained 
that Art. II 1(a) GATT had been violated.18 According to Art. II GATT, a 
WTO Member must grant to all other Members a treatment no less 
favourable than what has been agreed under its own goods schedule. This 
requires the application of ordinary customs duties not higher than those 
provided in such schedules. The Panel agreed with Panama, and thus found 
the measure in violation of Art. II 1 GATT.19  
                                                 
17 Colombia – Textiles, Request for the establishment of a panel by Panama, 
WT/461DS/3, 20/08/2013. 
18 Ibid; For a deeper understanding of how the compound tariff would be applied by 
Colombia and how it would result in a violation of Art. II:1(a) and (b) according to 
Panama, see Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.42-7.54.  
19 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel, (n 14) para 7.189. 
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Colombia, for its part, invoked inter alia as a defense the public moral 
exception under Art. XX(a) GATT. It argued that the compound tariff was 
necessary to prevent money laundering, one of the most profitable sources of 
financing for drug traffickers and organized criminal groups.20 Money 
laundering, drug trafficking and terrorism were activities regarded as illegal 
not only in the Colombian society, but also by the international community. 
Through the imposition of a heavier tax on imports below a certain price 
threshold, the compound tariff aimed to discourage imports at artificially low 
prices and thus it was supposed to prevent laundering.21 Setting prices too low 
would trigger the application of the compound tariff, which would make 
them soar to the level of ordinary market prices. Therefore, Colombia 
maintained that its measure was related to 'standards of right and wrong 
conduct', which corresponds with the definition of 'public morals' the Panel 
gave in US – Gambling.22  
The Panel, however, did not find the moral clause applicable to the measure 
at stake, as it concluded that Colombia had failed to demonstrate not only 
that the compound tariff was designed to combat money laundering, but also 
that it was necessary to achieve the intended aim.23 Moreover, the Panel 
found that the compound tariff constituted a means of arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination under Art. XX chapeau, since Colombia was not 
able to justify the exceptions provided by its tariff regulation.24 
The Panel thus applied the traditional two-tier test to assess the 
compatibility of the challenged measure with the moral clause. The AB then 
confirmed the Panel's findings adopting the same paradigm, even if its legal 
                                                 
20 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.195 ff. 
21 Ibid, paras 7.351 – 7.352. 
22 Ibid, paras 7.205-7.206; US – Gambling, Report of the Panel, WT/DS285/R, 
10/11/2004, para 6.465. 
23 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.440 and 7.470. 
24 Ibid, paras 7.591ff. For example, the compound tariff is not applicable to imports 
originating from countries which have signed a free trade agreement with 
Colombia. The AB did not scrutinise the compound tariff under Art. XX chapeau, 
as it did not comply with subparagraph(a) requirements, and therefore the second 
step of the test was deemed unnecessary. See Colombia – Textiles, Report of the 
Appellate Body, (n 12), para 6.11. 
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reasoning diverged from the Panel's in some respects.25 The interpretation 
and application of Art. XX GATT judicial test substantially followed the 
previous case law. However, the AB tried to clarify some aspects of the first 
step of the test. Due to their possible influence on future case law on 'public 
morals', they will be analysed in depth in the following sections, after a 
preliminary clarification of the notion of 'public morals'.  
III. 'PUBLIC MORALS': IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION  
1. The Definition of 'Public Morals' 
'Public morals' was defined for the first time by the Panel in US – Gambling as 
'standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
community or nation'.26 The dispute concerned a US ban on the cross-border 
supply of gambling and betting services. The US invoked Art. XIV(a) GATS, 
maintaining that online gambling could benefit organised crime and affect 
the behaviour of children and compulsive gamblers.27 Besides developing a 
definition, the Panel maintained that 'the content of [public morals] can vary 
in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing 
social, cultural, ethical and religious values'.28 Therefore, WTO Members 
'should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves [the concept 
of public morals] in their respective territories, according to their own 
systems and scales of values'.29 First the AB in US – Gambling, then the 
subsequent case law confirmed this definition, making US – Gambling a 
leading case.30 In Colombia – Textiles the Panel explicitly recognized 'the 
                                                 
25 See infra. 
26 US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22) para 6.463. The Panel resorted to the 
definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary, in order to interpret the notion of 
'public morals' according to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
(hereinafter VCLT).  
27 US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22) para 3.211. 
28 Ibid, para 6.461. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See US – Gambling, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R, 07/04/2005, 
para 296. China – Audiovisual Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS363/R, 
12/08/2009, para 7.759; EC – Seal Products, Report of the Panel (n 13) para 7.382, 
expanding the US – Gambling definition of 'public morals' also to Art. 2.2 Agreement 
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freedom of WTO members to define their own concept of public morals, in 
the light of factors such as the social, cultural, ethical and religious values 
prevailing in a society at a given moment in time'.31 It thus confirmed the 
definition given in US – Gambling.  
In this case law, WTO adjudicators undoubtedly aimed to grant a high degree 
of deference to national authorities in such a sensitive and uncertain matter 
like 'public morals'. What amounts to right or wrong conduct changes from 
one country to another, and it is often the result of cultural and political 
trade-offs. An international court thus finds itself ill-equipped to 
substantively scrutinise what may constitute 'public morals'. Indeed, it lacks 
democratic legitimacy,32 while national courts have more awareness of 
national hierarchies of values as well as fact-finding expertise.33 
Panels and the AB have thus considered applicable a non-intrusive standard 
of review for the specific assessment of what constitutes 'public morals'. In 
the context of international law, standard of review may be understood as the 
degree of deference or discretion that an international court accords to 
national legislators.34 In other terms, it expresses the willingness (or 
unwillingness) of an international court to substitute their assessments for 
                                                 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter TBT Agreement), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1868 UNTS 120. 
31 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14), para 7.338. 
32 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Legitimacy through 'Higher Law'? Why 
Constitutionalising WTO Is a Step Too Far', in Thomas Cottier and Petros C 
Mavroidis (eds), The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and 
Lessons for the WTO (University of Michigan Press 2003) 307, 332ff.; Michael 
Ioannidis, 'Beyond the Standard of Review: Deference Criteria in WTO Law and 
the Case for a Procedural Approach', in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner 
(eds.), Deference in International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2014), 
101; Andreas von Staden, 'The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond 
the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review' (2012) 10 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1023. 
33 Andrew T Guzman, 'Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO 
Disputes' (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 45, 64-69. 
34 Sungjoon Cho, 'Global Constitutional Lawmaking' (2010) 31 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 621, 643-644; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
and Nicolas Lockhart, 'Standard of Review in WTO Law', (2004) 7 Journal of 
International Economic Law 491, 493. 
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that of national authorities.35 It is an interpretative tool that comes into 
question every time international tribunals are called to examine whether a 
domestic measure complies with international law. It may thus address both 
questions of fact and questions of law, depending on the issue the 
adjudicating body is facing.36 To quote the AB in EC – Hormones, the standard 
of review affects 'the balance established […] between the jurisdictional 
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional 
competence retained by the Members for themselves', 37 thus allocating the 
power to decide upon factual and legal issues. 
While in the context of public morals a high degree of deference may seem 
inevitable, WTO adjudicating bodies have also taken the direction of 
deferential review into other fields. An example could be that of the 
assessment of scientific evidence in the recent case law on risk regulation 
under both GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement).38 In these disputes the AB focused on the reasonableness and 
coherence of the regulatory choice under scrutiny rather than verifying the 
correctness of the scientific data.39 This approach allowed them to be more 
respectful of domestic policies, since a measure may validly be based on 
                                                 
35 Ioannidis (n 32) 94.  
36 See Matthias Oesch, 'Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution' (2003) 6 
Journal of International Economic Law 635, 639ff. 
37 EC – Hormones, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, 16/01/1998, paras 
115-117. According to the AB, the intensity of the applicable standard of review may 
vary between the two opposite poles of 'de novo review' and 'total deference'. The 
former allows a Panel to completely substitute its own findings for those of the 
national authority and to arrive to a different factual or legal conclusion. The latter 
means that judicial review should not substantially interfere with national 
authorities findings of facts, legal interpretation or ultimate decisions, but 
contrariwise should be limited to the formal examination of whether procedural 
requirements for the adoption of a measure were complied with. See also Oesch (n 
36) 638. 
38 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
39 See eg, EC – Asbestos, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, 5/04/2001, 
para 168; Brazil – Retreated Tyres, Report of the Panel, WT/DS332/R, 17/12/ 2007, 
paras 7.61, 7.68; US – Tuna II (Mexico), Report of the Panel, WT/DS381/R, 13/06/ 
2012, para 7.504. 
2017}  Tackling Diversity inside WTO 277 
 
 
minority scientific opinions rather than mainstream science.40 Given that 
deference is necessary in a field that may rely on scientific objectivity, a 
fortiori it may be appropriate when it comes to morality-related disputes.  
Other international courts have proved to be highly deferential as well. For 
instance, it is worth mentioning the case of the European Court of Human 
Rights' (ECtHR) well-established doctrine of the margin of appreciation. 
According to this, national authorities are better placed than international 
judges to assess local values and their application.41 Moreover, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) applied a similar standard of review 
when confronted with national risk regulation policies. In particular, it 
recognized that public institutions should enjoy a broad level of discretion in 
defining the level of protection pursued and the 'appropriate means of 
action'.42 
Considering the shape the WTO has taken hitherto, this unilateralist 
approach may well be said to be the only sustainable solution, as it allows 
                                                 
40 Lukasz Gruszczynski and Valentina Vadi, 'Standard of Review and Scientific 
Evidence in WTO Law and International Investment Arbitration: Converging 
Parallels?', in Gruszczynski and Werner (n 32) 165ff. 
41 See Handyside v UK 1 EHRR 737 (1976), para 48. A wide number of scholars have 
dealt with the margin of appreciation doctrine: see eg, Janneke Gerards, 'Pluralism, 
Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine' (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 80; Jan Kratochvìl, 'The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the 
European Court of Human Rights' (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 324; Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights 
Law: Deference and Proportionality (Oxford University Press 2012); George Letsas, 
'Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation' (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 705; Yuval Shany, 'Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law' (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 926.  
42 Case C-333/08 Commission v France EU:C:2010:44, paras 85-86; Case C-192/01 
Commission v Denmark EU:C:2003:492, paras 42-43. See Alberto Alemanno, Trade 
in Food—Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO (Cameron May 
2007), 325ff; Alberto Alemanno, 'EU Risk Regulation and Science: The Role of 
Experts in Decision-making and Judicial Review' in Ellen Vos (ed), European Risk 
Governance—Its Science, its Inclusiveness and its Effectiveness (Mannheim: Connex 
Report Series No. 6, 2008) 59-63; Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska, 'Risk, 
Precaution and Scientific Complexity before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union', in Gruszczynski and Werner (n 32) 198ff. 
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Members with minority views to undertake trade liberalization 
commitments without questioning their religious, cultural and ethnic 
specificity. Moreover, this approach appears more suitable with the negative 
integration paradigm on which WTO is premised. As long as WTO 
Members do not discriminate between imported and domestically produced 
goods or services of the same kind, they have a right to freely regulate in 
accordance with national public policy choices.43 Imposing de facto a 
homogeneous definition of 'public morals' on Member States would thus not 
only be illegitimate, but also superfluous, given that the WTO's goal is 
ensuring non-discrimination and equal treatment in trade relations, rather 
than building a community based on cultural and religious homogeneity.44  
Moreover, as scholars have suggested, a less intrusive scrutiny of what 
amounts to 'public morals' may be balanced out by a stringent one in the 
subsequent steps of the test, namely the necessity analysis and the application 
of Art. XX chapeau.45 The case law seems to have already found this 
equilibrium. In the four disputes which have occurred hitherto, the objective 
pursued by the measures at stake was always recognized as a matter of 'public 
morals'. However, a measure was never found justifiable under Art. XX(a) 
GATT. In China – Audiovisual Products and in Colombia – Textiles the measure 
was not found 'necessary to protect public morals', whereas in US – Gambling 
and in EC – Seal Products it eventually failed the scrutiny under Art. XX 
chapeau.46 A general mistrust of WTO Members seems thus to underlie these 
judicial decisions, as the adjudicating bodies, while according high deference 
to member States' moral concerns, eventually prevent them from enforcing 
measures apt to protect those values. 
                                                 
43 See China – Audiovisual Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS363/AB/R, 
21/12/2009, para 222. 
44 Gisele Kapterian, 'A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on 'Necessity'' (2010) 59 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 89, 98. 
45 See Marwell (n 4) 827ff. 
46 China – Audiovisual Products, Report of the Appellate Body (n 43) paras 336f; 
Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.116; US – Gambling, 
Report of the Appellate Body (n 30) para 372; EC – Seal Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.339. 
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2. Proof of 'Public Morals' 
However, deference is directly proportional to the risk of national policies 
deviating from international law commitments. Were WTO adjudicating 
bodies to omit any kind of scrutiny, WTO Members may easily disguise 
protectionist measures behind Art. XX(a) GATT. In order to avoid such a 
drift, scholars have rightly suggested that Members invoking the moral clause 
should produce appropriate evidence that the measure's aim is an issue of 
moral significance for their own citizens.47 Indeed, even if a Panel may not 
substitute its assessments for those of domestic decision-makers, nothing 
prevents it from reviewing whether States have exercised their discretion in 
bona fide and in a reasonable way.48 In other words, an international tribunal 
may certainly not claim to be the authentic interpreter of a Member State's 
Volksgeist, imposing its own scale of values. Nonetheless, this should not 
obviate the need for sufficient evidence to support a particular claim. 
In the light of the US – Gambling doctrine, relevant evidence may stem 
exclusively from WTO Members' domestic fora. The international 
community’s consensus with regard to an issue of 'public morals' is thus not 
necessary to prove that the measure being challenged complies with Art. 
XX(a) GATT.49 This of course does not mean that adjudicating bodies may 
                                                 
47 This approach was developed by Marwell (n 4). According to Marwell, evidence 
could include historical practice, legislative history of the measure, the country's 
international commitments previously undertaken, contemporary public opinion 
polls, results of political referenda, statements of accredited religious leaders. See 
also Tamara Perišin, 'Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a Sealed Deal? EU and 
WTO Challenges' (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 373, 
394f: 'WTO generally does not require countries to have the same views on issues 
[…] but it has to be proven that the protected interest corresponds to the EU's 
'public morals''. 
48 Shany (n 41) 910. 
49 In contrast, some scholars have argued that Art. XX(a) may be invoked to protect 
moral concerns that are shared universally, rather than crafted unilaterally within 
national borders. Countries would thus be required to show that the public moral 
is shared widely by a group of similarly situated countries. Among the major 
advocates of this approach, known as 'universalism' or 'transnationalism', see 
Miguel A Gonzalez, 'Trade and Morality: Preserving 'Public Morals' Without 
Sacrificing the Global Economy' (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 
939; Christian Häberli, 'Seals and the Need for More Deference to Vienna by 
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not take into consideration moral concerns expressed by the international 
community, but rather that they may use these trends only as arguments ad 
abundantiam when assessing the legitimacy of a trade restriction on moral 
grounds. In other words, on the one hand, a common understanding of a 
moral issue may reduce the risk of a hidden protectionist measure. On the 
other hand, its absence may not lead by itself to the failure of the justification 
under Art. XX(a) GATT.50  
Since US – Gambling, in WTO case law the country invoking the general 
exceptions was always asked to prove that the moral concern at issue was felt 
by its citizens, and that it was the policy objective of the measure being 
challenged.51 In Colombia – Textiles, the Panel relied on a wide range of 
evidence to conclude that combating money laundering was a policy 
objective designed to protect 'public morals' in Colombia. In particular, the 
Panel took into consideration both national pieces of legislation and 
international instruments ratified by Colombia, showing Colombia's 
commitment to fighting against money laundering.52  
The Panel's reliance on evidence stemming from the international forum 
should not be deemed at odds with the unilateralist paradigm mentioned 
before. Indeed, the ratification of international instruments may represent 
the projection into foreign affairs of an internal moral concern. Therefore, a 
Member State's international commitments may constitute relevant 
evidence of what amounts to 'public morals' in its society. They may also 
                                                 
WTO Adjudicators' (2014) Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No 22 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463680> accessed 12 October 2016; Wu (n 7) 238-242. 
50 See Moonhawk Kim, 'Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO' 
(2012) 64 World Politics 426, 435; Tyler M Smith, 'Much Needed Reform in the 
Real of Public Morals: a Proposed Addition to the GATT Article XX(a) 'Public 
Morals' Framework Resulting from China – Audiovisual' (2011) 19 Cardozo Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 733, 762; Nicolas F Diebold, 'The Morals 
and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the 
Undermining Mole' (2007) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 43, 63-64. 
51 See US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22), paras 6.474ff; China – Audiovisual 
Products, Report of the Panel (n 30) para 7.751; EC – Seal Products, Report of the 
Panel (n 13) paras 7.386 ff. 
52 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.335-7.337. 
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prove that the international community shares the same values. However, a 
coherent interpretation of the US – Gambling doctrine requires that 
international consensus should be stricto sensu unnecessary, as I have tried to 
explain above. Nonetheless, in its submissions Colombia frequently stressed 
that the international community supported its moral concerns regarding 
illicit trade, drug trafficking and money laundering in particular.53 It expressly 
mentioned treaties and conventions it had ratified as evidence that 'money 
laundering [was] conduct deemed illegal by the international community'.54 
Yet Colombia was not the first State to adopt this line of defense. In China – 
Audiovisual Products, the US accused China of restricting market access for 
foreign audiovisual entertainment products and for foreign suppliers seeking 
to engage in the distribution of those products.55 Invoking Art. XX(a) 
GATT, China mentioned UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity to show that the international community deemed cultural 
products capable of having a major impact on public morals.56 However, this 
trend appears even clearer in EC – Seal Products. The dispute was about an 
import ban imposed by the EU on seal products. The EU justified it on the 
ground that some hunting and killing methods adopted in certain States 
(mainly Canada and Norway) had raised moral concerns among the EU 
population due to their cruelty.57 In addition to pieces of EU legislation, the 
EU referred to recommendations of the Office International des Epizooties 
(Guiding Principles for Animal Welfare), other WTO Members' measures 
on seal products based on moral grounds, as well as the 'philosophy of animal 
welfare' and its connection to 'a long-established tradition of moral thought' 
worldwide.58 
This trend may thus reflect a general mistrust among WTO Members 
towards the application of the US – Gambling doctrine. Indeed, the 
arguments mentioned should be only ad abundantiam, but instead they played 
                                                 
53 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.63, 7.89, 7.94, 7.205, 7.332, 
7.509. 
54 Ibid, para 7.98.  
55 China – Audiovisual Products, Report of the Panel (n 30), paras 2.1ff.  
56 Ibid, para 7.751. 
57 EC – Seal Products, Report of the Panel (n 13) paras 2.1ff. 
58 Ibid, para 7.408. 
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a prominent role in WTO Members' lines of defence. Even though the AB 
interpretation of 'public morals' is meant to enhance regulatory autonomy, it 
seems that Member States would rather rely on evidence stemming from the 
international forum, due to its highly persuasive value. This could be Member 
States' response to the reciprocal lack of confidence the judicial bodies have 
implicitly expressed hitherto, as I have explained above.  
In Colombia – Textiles the conclusion that fighting money laundering was an 
issue of 'public morals' was rather straightforward, even if the international 
community had not shared the same view. There was a well-established line 
of legislation tackling the issue, and most of all money laundering was 
punished as a crime in Colombia.59 Therefore, it referred by definition to 
'standards of right and wrong conduct', as the WTO interpretation of 'public 
morals' requires. Moreover, in US – Gambling WTO adjudicating bodies had 
already recognised that anti-money laundering policies may legitimately 
justify trade restrictions.60  
However, it is worth noting that all the evidence submitted by Colombia was 
of a legislative kind, either of national or international origins. The Panel thus 
decided on this exclusive basis.61 From a general point of view, national 
legislation may assure a high degree of certainty, as its evidentiary value is less 
volatile and questionable compared to that of opinion polls or statements by 
religious leaders, for example.62 However, WTO adjudicating bodies should 
handle this kind of evidence with care.  
                                                 
59 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) para 7.205. 
60 US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22) para 6.492. See also US – Gambling, 
Report of the Appellate Body (n 30) para 301. The Panel in Colombia – Textiles 
explicitly mentions this judicial precedent, see para 7.338. 
61 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.335-7.338. This is not a new 
feature in the Panels and the AB legal reasoning. In EC – Seal Products, EU pieces 
of legislation amounted to a major portion of the evidence submitted. Leaving aside 
the evidence showing that the international community shared EU moral 
concerns, they were the only ground on which the Panel decided that animal 
welfare was felt as a moral concern by European citizens. See EC – Seal Products, 
Report of the Panel (n 13) paras 7.415ff. 
62 For instance, in EC – Seal Products the EU adduced several opinion polls to prove 
that the objective of its import ban, namely seal welfare, was felt as a moral concern 
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In particular, legislation should be in line with a society's contemporary 
beliefs in order to be deemed relevant proof under Art. XX(a).63 Otherwise, 
labelling an issue as one of ethical concern would require 'little more than the 
sponsor of a legislation'.64 Therefore, the Panels and the ABs should also take 
into account several context-dependent elements in order to determine 
whether national legislation could be of some relevance. For instance, they 
could verify whether there is a well-established legislative history behind the 
challenged measure, showing that the latter belongs to a coherent context 
that has persisted through the years. They could also consider whether or not 
the measure in question followed an ordinary iter legis. Furthermore, they 
could also take into consideration whether there have been political 
referenda or relevant court decisions surrounding the issue, as well as protests 
carried out by social or cultural movements. Also, as the Panel did in Colombia 
– Textiles, the fact that the Member State has undertaken several 
international commitments related to the moral ground invoked should be 
assessed.  
V. APPLYING THE MORAL CLAUSE  
1. The 'Design and Structure' of the Measure 
Showing that 'public morals' in Colombia could encompass money 
laundering was not enough for the Panel to conclude that the compound 
tariff was designed to protect public morals. According to the Panel, 
Colombia failed to demonstrate (1) first that, if a product's price was low 
enough to trigger the application of the compound tariff, it was necessarily 
because it had been undervalued; 2) second that its undervaluation was 
                                                 
by the European population. See EC – Seal Products, First Written Submission by 
the European Union, WT/DS400, 21/12/2012, paras 194ff.  
63 Panagiotis Delimatsis, 'Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting the 
WTO Rulings on US – Gambling and China – Publications and Audiovisual Products' 
(2011) Journal of International Economic Law 257, 259.  
64 Joost Pauwelyn, 'The Public Morals Exception After Seals: How to Keep It in 
Check?' (International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 27 May 2014) 
<http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/05/the-public-morals-
exception>-after-seals-how-to-keep-it-in-check.html accessed 29 December 2016. 
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necessarily serving money laundering purposes.65 In other words, the Panel 
acknowledged that among the imported products affected by the compound 
tariff there could have also been those undervalued for money laundering 
purposes. However, Colombia's measure had too wide a scope of application, 
because it was also able to affect products that did not constitute a threat to 
public morals. The Panel thus concluded that Colombia had failed to 
demonstrate that the measure was designed to protect money laundering, as 
a necessary connection between the compound tariff and the alleged objective 
had not been shown.66 
However, the Panel's implicit admission that a connection between the 
measure and the objective could at least be plausible was enough for the AB 
to reverse the Panel findings on this specific issue. Even if it eventually 
confirmed that the challenged measure was not justifiable under Article XX 
GATT, the AB considered the measure at least 'designed' to protect public 
morals. According to the AB, 'if the measure is not incapable of protecting 
public morals, there must be a relationship between the measure and the 
protection of public morals'.67 This potential connection may result from the 
'content, structure and expected operation' of the measure, i.e. evidence such 
as text of statutes and regulations, the measure's legislative history, and its 
objective.68 If it exists, then one needs to conclude that the measure was 
designed to protect public morals. The AB thus set a very low threshold for 
the 'design' step of the analysis, consistently expanding the zone of legality 
within which WTO Members are free to operate by virtue of Art. XX(a).The 
equation between 'designed to protect public morals' and 'not incapable of 
protecting public morals' ultimately affects the responding State's burden of 
proof, making it considerably lighter.69  
                                                 
65 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.362ff. 
66 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.399-7.400. 
67 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.68. 
68 Ibid, para 5.80.  
69 With regard to the issue of the burden of proof in WTO law, see Joost Pauwelyn, 
'Defenses and the Burden of Proof in International Law' in Lorand Bartels and 
Federica Paddeu (eds), Exceptions under International Law (Oxford University Press 
forthcoming), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id= 
2863962> accessed 23 February 2017.  
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The AB conclusion is imbued with an inherent logic: if there is at least a 
chance that a measure accomplishes its task, then its design and structure 
clearly are 'not incapable of protecting public morals'. The mere fact that the 
measure is capable of restricting both morally dangerous trades and morally 
neutral ones does not lead automatically to the conclusion that the measure 
is not designed to protect public morals. The measure will probably result as 
disproportionately trade-restrictive, but this will be ascertained in the second 
step of the test, i.e. the necessity test, where the measure's qualitative and 
quantitative contribution to the objective pursued will be assessed. In other 
terms, the AB clarified that the 'design' step is a matter of whether the 
measure could make any contribution to the accomplishment of its purpose, 
whereas the 'necessity' step is about the quantum of the contribution.70  
2. The Necessity Analysis 
Once a measure's design and structure are found appropriate to protect 
'public morals', the judicial review needs to focus on the necessity of the 
measure at stake. The necessity analysis is not an unique feature of Art. XX(a) 
GATT, as subparagraphs (b) and (d) demand the same benchmark. Moreover, 
Art. XIV GATS includes symmetrical provisions. WTO case law has 
fostered an interpretative unification of the necessity analysis. First, the 
Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes maintained that the term 'necessary' had the 
same meaning under both subparagraph (b) and (d).71 Then the Panel in US – 
Gambling interpreted the necessity requirement of Art. XIV(a) GATS 
                                                 
70 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.103: 'in an analysis of 
necessity, a Panel's duty is to assess, in a qualitative and quantitative manner, the 
extent of the measure's contribution to the end pursued, rather than merely 
ascertaining whether or not the measure makes any contribution. […] whereas an 
assessment of whether the measure is 'designed' to protect public morals focuses 
on determining whether the measure is or is not incapable of protecting public 
morals, an examination of the measure's contribution to the protection of public 
morals focuses on determining the degree of such contribution, in a qualitative or 
quantitative manner'. 
71 Thailand – Cigarettes, Report of the Panel, BISD 37S/200, 7/11/1990, para 74. 
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following the same case law.72 Finally, the Panel in China – Audiovisual applied 
the same test when interpreting Art. XX(a) GATT.73 
The test developed through the case law may be split into two main tiers: the 
'Weighing and Balancing' (WAB) formula and the 'Least Trade-Restrictive 
Means' (LTRM) paradigm. This two-tier test is the offspring of a long 
interpretative effort started in the GATT era. Even though they now 
constitute two features of a unitary concept, the two steps of the test 
emerged in different moments in time.  
The initial interpretation of necessity consisted only in the LTRM test. 
According to the Panel in US – Section 337, a measure could have been deemed 
'necessary' as long as a less trade-restrictive measure was not available.74 If 
such a measure existed, then a State would have been bound to use it.75 This 
test was further improved by the Panel in US – Gasoline, where it stated that 
WTO Members enjoy absolute freedom to choose the value to pursue and to 
set the level of protection they deem appropriate.76 Moreover, the following 
case law specified that the alternative measure should be 'reasonably 
available' to the responding State. This means that first, the alternative 
measure should permit the responding State to preserve the same degree of 
protection initially sought. Second, it should not impose an undue burden on 
the responding State, in terms of e.g. administrative costs or technical 
difficulties.77 It rests upon the complaining party to identify possible 
alternatives that the responding party could take.78 
However, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef introduced 
a preliminary step in the necessity analysis, i.e. the WAB formula. According 
to the Appellate Body, an assessment of the necessity of a measure requires a 
'process of weighing and balancing' of at least three factors: (1) the 
importance of the interests and values protected; (2) the contribution of the 
                                                 
72 US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22) para 6.448. 
73 China – Audiovisual Products, Report of the Panel (n 30) paras 7.782ff. 
74 US – Section 337, Report of the Panel (n 16) para 5.26.  
75 Ibid. 
76 US – Gasoline, Report of the Panel (n 16) paras 6.22 and 7.1. 
77 See Korea –Various Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 15) para 180; 
EC – Asbestos, Report of the Appellate Body (n 39) paras 172-174.  
78 US – Gambling, Report of the Appellate Body (n 30) paras 309-311. 
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challenged measure to the objective pursued; (3) the trade-restrictiveness of 
the measure.79 These factors would then interact according to some general 
rules of thumb. First, '[t]he more vital or important those common interests 
or values are' and the greater the measure's contribution to the objective 
pursued, 'the more easily the measure might be considered 'necessary''.80 
Second, a measure with a 'relatively slight impact upon imported products 
might more easily be considered 'necessary' than a measure with intense or 
broader restrictive effects'.81 
In subsequent disputes, from EC – Asbestos to Colombia – Textiles, the WAB 
test was always deemed as an unavoidable step of the test by the Panels and 
the AB. However, in Colombia – Textiles it appears to have even gained a 
logical prominence within the structure of the necessity test. Both the Panel 
and the AB treated the measure's compliance with the WAB formula not 
only as an autonomous aspect of their analysis, but as a logical condition in 
order to move forward to the LTRM part of the test. The Panel in Colombia 
– Textiles was explicit when it maintained that only '[i]f the preliminary 
conclusion is that the measure is necessary, the result should be confirmed by 
comparing the challenged measure with possible, reasonably available, 
WTO-consistent or less inconsistent alternatives that could have less trade-
restrictive effects while making an equivalent contribution to the 
achievement of the objective pursued'.82 The AB then confirmed the Panel's 
approach, describing the LTRM test as merely a potential step of the test 
that 'in most cases' may follow the application of the WAB formula.83 
Coherently, both the Panel and the AB considered irrelevant a comparison 
                                                 
79 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 15) para 164.  
80 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 15), para 163. 
81 Ibid, para 163. The Appellate Body here clearly echoes Alexy's famous 
interpretation of balancing as optimization: see Robert Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 102: 'the greater the degree of 
non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the grater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other'.  
82 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) para 7.310 (emphasis added).  
83 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.102 (emphasis 
added). 
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with possible alternative measures, once they had found that Colombia had 
failed to demonstrate that the measure was necessary at the WAB tier.84  
Nevertheless, this seems to constitute a significant logical flaw in the Panel's 
and the AB's legal reasoning. In particular, the WAB paradigm itself raises 
more questions than it answers, since it factors in the importance of the 
protected interest. WTO case law expressly acknowledged that Members 
pursuing a legitimate domestic goal should be able to choose their 'own level 
of protection'.85 This imposes a judicial self-restraint that may hardly coexist 
with the WAB exercise, as the 'level of protection' sought is a direct 
consequence of the importance of the protected interest. Moreover, if WTO 
judicial bodies had to decide which value should prevail in a conflict of rights, 
the judicial review would be at odds with the WTO negative integration 
paradigm.86 Finally, giving leeway to WTO Members to set the importance 
of the value pursued is coherent with a holistic interpretation of the moral 
clause.  
If it is up to WTO Members to decide what constitutes 'public morals', then 
for the same reasons they should be the ones entitled to express the 
importance of a certain moral concerns, according to their own society's 
hierarchy of values. Leaving to the WTO adjudicating bodies the power to 
decide on the importance of the interests and values protected would then be 
at odds with the high deference accorded in the first step of the test. 
Therefore, the first factor of the WAB formula should be untouchable by 
definition. For its part, the Panel in Colombia – Textiles did not question 
Colombia's claim that fighting money laundering constitutes a 'social interest 
                                                 
84 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.115; Colombia – 
Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) para 7.447.  
85 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 15) para 176. 
86 Filippo Fontanelliand Giuseppe Martinico, 'Browsing the XX Files: Necessity in 
the GATT, and Why It Is Not Like Proportionality in the EU' [2013] Xi Nan 
Zheng Fa Da Xue Xue Bao 32, 38; Donald H Regan, 'The Meaning of Necessary in 
GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing' 
(2007) 6 World Trade Review 347, 349; Jan Neumann and Elizabeth Turk, 
'Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law after 
Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos, and EC-Sardines (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 199, 232, 
claiming that balancing sensitive issues requires a strong sense of democratic 
legitimacy. 
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[…] vital and important in the highest degree'.87 Moreover, in order to reach 
this conclusion, it considered the same evidence assessed in the 'design' step 
of the test and applied a similar legal reasoning.88 It thus followed the Panels' 
approach both in US – Gambling and in China – Audiovisual Products. In these 
disputes the Panels were highly deferential when assessing the importance of 
the interest pursued, and mostly relied on the same evidence they had 
considered in the 'design' step of the test.89 As in Colombia – Textiles, the 
interest in question were found to be of the highest importance in the 
Member State's society.90 
The WAB test might then focus on the measure's contribution to the 
objective and its trade-restrictiveness. However, the assessment of these two 
factors leaves the door open to a wide range of questions, which are clearly 
exemplified in Colombia – Textiles. In this dispute, the AB clarified that the 
'examination of the measure's contribution to the protection of public 
morals focuses on determining the degree of such contribution, in a qualitative 
or quantitative manner'.91 This constitutes the main distinction between the 
analysis of the contribution and that of the design of the measure. While the 
latter addresses whether the challenged act is capable of protecting public 
morals, the former pays attentions to how much protection the measure may 
assure. However, the AB has not set any benchmark in order to carry out such 
an assessment. How then should a Panel determine the degree of 
contribution of the measure at stake? Which aspects should it factor in? And 
which would be the specific features of high contribution? And of low 
contribution? The Panels' assessment would then risk being arbitrary and 
scarcely transparent. 
Nonetheless, a way out from this maze of questions may be found inside the 
necessity test itself, specifically in the LTRM paradigm. The Panels' legal 
reasoning would certainly gain in clarity if a measure's contribution was 
                                                 
87 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) para 7.408. 
88 Ibid, paras 7.404ff.  
89 US – Gambling, Report of the Panel (n 22), para 6.492; China – Audiovisual Products, 
Report of the Panel (n 30) para 7.817. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) para 5.103 (emphasis added). 
See also Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) para 7.423. 
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appraised in relative rather than absolute terms. In other words, it would be 
easier for a Panel to assess whether a measure's contribution is higher or lower 
than that of an alternative measure reasonably available, instead of high or low 
in general terms. In this way, a definition of what constitutes a high or low 
contribution would not be needed. Moreover, were the Panel to rule out a 
measure without being sure that an alternative one is available, Members' 
freedom to regulate would be seriously jeopardised.  
Colombia's compound tariff may constitute a relevant example. First the 
Panel, then the AB could not carry out thoroughly the WAB test because of 
a lack of evidence in Colombia's allegations.92 Consequently, the measure had 
to be ruled out, since it failed the WAB test. In particular, the measure's 
degree of contribution to the objective pursued could not be determined in 
light of the available information.93 On the one hand, the Panel 
acknowledged that the interest protected was 'vital and important in the 
highest degree'. On the other hand, it found that the measure was highly 
trade-restrictive. Now, consider for a moment a hypothetical scenario in 
which the burden of proof was satisfied, but still the measure failed the WAB 
test because its contribution to the objective pursued was deemed 
insufficient to balance out its trade-restrictiveness. The Panel and then the 
AB would thus reject Colombia's defence. Yet, if there is no alternative 
measure that may pursue Colombia's objective to fight money laundering, 
should that moral concern be deprived of any form of protection? In other 
words, before stating that a measure is disproportionately trade-restrictive, 
should not the AB verify that it is not the only possible way to protect a 'vital' 
interest?  
In the light of all this, the LTRM test seems the most appropriate tool to 
reach the best compromise between trade-restrictiveness and the right to 
regulate. In addition, it excludes the need for Panels and the AB to engage in 
a likely intrusive balancing between legitimate non-trade values and free 
trade interests.94 Moreover, even admitting for a moment that the WAB's 
rationale is sustainable, it results of no practical added use. As a matter of fact, 
                                                 
92 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14), paras 7.423, 7.430, 7.437, 7.445; 
Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Appellate Body (n 12) paras 5.110, 5.115, 5.116. 
93 Colombia – Textiles, Report of the Panel (n 14) paras 7.414 ff. 
94 Regan (n 86) 350-353.  
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the LTRM test already factors in the WAB's features of the measure's 
contribution and trade-restrictiveness.95 The remarkable advantage of the 
LTRM test is that the assessment of the reasonable availability of an 
alternative measure does not imply second-guessing a Member State's 
hierarchy of values. Indeed, a measure is reasonably available if it is able to 
assure the same level of protection while not entailing additional 
enforcement costs. The problem then is not how a Member State should 
allocate its funds, which is also a policy choice modelled after a particular 
hierarchy of values, but the focus is on how the same budget may be invested 
in a more WTO consistent trade measure. What thus comes into question in 
the LTRM analysis are mostly technical issues, characterised by a higher 
degree of certainty and objectivity. This may allow WTO adjudicating bodies 
to push their review to a deeper tier, judging the technicalities and the 
appropriateness of the means adopted by a Member State, rather than the end 
itself.96 
WTO's version of the balancing test should then be absorbed by the LTRM 
analysis in only one holistic reasoning. The necessity test would then be 
premised on one question: whether the same level of protection may be 
sought by a less trade-restrictive measure. The answer should be positive if 
there is a 'reasonably available' alternative, i.e. if its enforcement does not 
entail unreasonably high costs for the regulatory State. 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
To put it in geometrical terms, Art. XX(a) GATT represents the intersection 
of two planes: the first, horizontal, one is the ideological struggle between 
non-trade and trade values; the second, vertical one is the institutional 
tension between WTO adjudicating bodies and WTO Members, and 
                                                 
95 Fontanelli and Martinico (n 86) 38: 'the WAB does not have much to share with a 
real proportionality test, nor does it allow for express cost-benefit analysis' and that 
'the LTRM test is apt to ascertain the necessity of a measure, the WAB serving 
merely as a warm up test'. 
96 In more general terms, see Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (n 9) 254, maintaining that 
WTO is about the justiciability of means rather than ends. See also Korea –Various 
Measures on Beef, Report of the Appellate Body (n 15) para 176. 
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directly concerns the allocation of power.97 As WTO's number of Members 
is continuing to grow, the moral clause is likely to play an increasingly 
important role in legal and political dynamics inside the organization. 
However, since the moral clause lay dormant for more than five decades, 
several hermeneutical hurdles still need to be overcome.  
In Colombia – Textiles WTO adjudicating bodies were called to apply the 
GATT moral clause for the fourth time in its history. For the most part, they 
followed the previous case law, thus reinforcing what is now becoming to look 
like a more consolidated interpretation of the Art. XX(a) two-tier test. The 
AB confirmed that Member States' culturally-oriented regulations deserve a 
high degree of deference. In particular, the AB helped clarify the applicable 
threshold in the 'design' step of the analysis. A measure will now be deemed 
designed to protect 'public morals' if it is not incapable of reaching this goal. 
The threshold for compliance has thus been considerably lowered. 
At first glance, it may appear that a scarcely intrusive standard of review in 
the first part of Art. XX(a) test may jeopardise the WTO edifice, giving 
leeway to the enforcement of highly trade-restrictive measures. Member 
States could merely label a protectionist measure as a protection for 'public 
morals' (and provide appropriate evidence) to have it justified under Art. 
XX(a) GATT. However, a highly deferential scrutiny on what constitutes 
'public morals' may be balanced out by a more stringent one in the subsequent 
steps of the test, namely the necessity analysis and Art. XX GATT chapeau. 
Adopting this perspective, the judicial review would focus less on the values 
at stake and more on the technical aspects of a measure's enforcement. 
In particular, Art. XX GATT chapeau guarantees that the application of a 
measure does not amount to an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. 
Once it has been verified that the measure complies with one or more of Art. 
XX GATT substantive provisions, the focus thus shifts to whether its 
application constitutes a discrimination among 'countries where the same 
conditions prevails'.98 The issue under the spotlight is how the measure is 
enforced vis-à-vis WTO Members. This is a relative assessment relying on 
the measure's objective implementation, but there is no room for a judgment 
                                                 
97 Kapterian (n 44) 90. 
98 Mavroidis, Bermann and Wu (n 7) 709ff.  
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concerning the importance of the interests and values protected.99 The 
necessity test may also provide for such a guarantee if it is correctly carried 
out. Nevertheless, the logical structure the Panel and the AB gave to their 
necessity analysis in Colombia – Textiles raises concerns. The application of 
the two-step test conferred logical prominence to the former, while 
describing the latter only as a potential and conditional phase of the test. 
However, the WAB formula may turn into a highly intrusive and scarcely 
transparent judicial review, being at odds with the negative integration 
principle on which the WTO is premised. On the contrary, the LTRM 
paradigm provides WTO judicial bodies with a clearer and simpler 
benchmark in order to conduct a comparative analysis. Most of all, the 
LTRM test does not imply a judicial scrutiny involving a Member State's 
morally-based policy choices. In contrast, it concerns the technical aspects of 
the measure’s enforcement.100  
Clarifying the role of the WBA formula – if there should be one – should be 
a priority for the Panels in future disputes, since it now appears as the most 
critical aspect of Art. XX(a) GATT test for compliance.
                                                 
99 Marwell (n 4) 829ff. 
100 Marwell (n 4), 827ff.  
